Wounded Knee — What Really Happened

"Clearly, Wounded Knee Was No My Lai or Malmedy..."

by Major Mark A. Farrar

Late afternoon, December 29, 1890, Pine Ridge Reservation, Dakota Territory. On a blanket of frozen snow, at an insignificant valley named for the nearby creek of "Wounded Knee," 261 people lay dead or dying within a 400-meter perimeter. The casualties include men, women, and children from two Sioux tribes, soldiers of the U.S. 7th Cavalry, two newspaper reporters, an Army translator, and a Catholic priest.

These human casualties of Wounded Knee have never been in question, but the motives, conduct of the participants, and responsibility for the incident have been left to us with a greatly revised, factually inaccurate, and extremely one-sided version.

According to these revisionist accounts, a drunken and disorderly 7th Cavalry rounded up helpless Native Americans and ruthlessly gunned them down to avenge Little Big Horn. Automatic weapons assisted the process of coldly murdering unarmed women and children, and the casualties inflicted on 7th Cavalry were a result of fratricide. Although this version sells well in politically correct circles, the facts of the event (which are supported by both Sioux and 7th Cavalry sources, the results of an Army inquiry, an 1894 independent inquiry by the Bureau of Indian Ethnology, a Presidential investigation, and my own research) speak otherwise.

Wounded Knee Background

The events leading to Wounded Knee can be traced to one Indian named Wovoka.[1] He claimed to have died, gone to heaven, and witnessed a millennial vision of an exclusive Indian world to come. The "new" world would be one devoid of the white man. Buffalo would roam the plains once more. Dead relatives would be reunited with their living families. The millennium would result by singing and dancing. Wovoka's vision became known as the "Ghost Dance." Most Western tribes practiced this unusual mixture of Christian and Native American spiritualism in a non-violent manner. However, the Dakota Territory reservations took a different interpretation. Two Indians (Short Bull and Kicking Bear) viewed the dance as a medium to bring the Sioux nation to arms. They thought the millennium would occur faster if the white man were removed.[2]

Still fresh in the public's mind, was the Minnesota Sioux Uprising. In 1862, the Santee Sioux had risen up against the town of New Ulm, killing over 400 settlers.[3] The main cause for that tragedy resulted from a lack of food. Through government ineptitude, a similar situation was in progress in the Dakota Territory.[4]

By October 1890, the Ghost Dance concentrated on two reservations: Standing Rock (home to none other than Sitting Bull) and Pine Ridge (on the Dakota/Nebraska border). The new agent of the Pine Ridge reservation, D. F. Royer, found himself facing a serious movement. On October 12, he frantically reported that no less than half of the 6,000 Pine Ridge Indians were ghost dancing and were beyond control

of tribal Indian police. He urgently requested the Army to quell the dancing.[5]

The Department of Missouri commander, Gen. Nelson Miles, disagreed with Royer's assessment. Ten years earlier, Miles had been commander of the operation that brought Sitting Bull's tribe to the reservation.[6] In the opinion of Miles, the Army's most experienced Indian campaigner, the dance movement would fade away, and so Miles vehemently opposed the use of force. Royer was not satisfied and went behind Miles' back to request troops.[7] The Miles/Royer disagreement would be the first of two disastrous civilian interferences.

As the crisis entered its third week, it appeared that a show of force might possibly bring the uprising to a close. To hasten the ending, agents and the military produced lists of key leaders who were rounded up by Indian police.[8] One of the key leaders was Sitting Bull. It had been on his personal invitation that the Ghost Dance was brought to Standing Rock. Despite the reservation agent's (James McLaughlin's) objections, Sitting Bull continued to sponsor the Ghost Dance.[9]

Miles was very familiar with Sitting Bull and wanted to bring him in quietly. He enlisted the aid of Sitting Bull's friend, William Cody (Buffalo Bill), to encourage Sitting Bull to surrender. In violation of Miles' plans, Agent McLaughlin diverted Cody and sent his own Indian police to arrest Sitting Bull.[10] Just as Royer's interference exacerbated an already tense situation, MacLaughlin's actions proved even more disastrous. As the Indian police arrested Sitting Bull, a gunfight erupted. Within minutes, six Indian police were dead, including Sitting Bull and eight of his followers.[11] Ironically, Sitting Bull was shot dead by one of his own people from the tribal police.

Perhaps sensing imminent government intervention, Short Bull urged the Ghost Dancers to gather at a sacred place in the Dakota Badlands known as the "Stronghold." There they were to wait for the coming of an Indian messiah. He exhorted his followers to dance, even if they were surrounded by Army troops.[12] He also encouraged the dancers to don "ghost shirts" that were believed to be bulletproof.

When the Ghost Dancers moved towards the Stronghold, the President ordered the Secretary of War to assume military control of Standing Rock and Pine Ridge reservations. On November 17, 3,000 U.S. troops deployed onto the Dakota reservations with the mission of ending the Ghost Dance.[13] Based upon the botched incidents leading to military intervention, a key tenet of the operation was transfer of authority from the Indian agency to the Army. On December 1, the Secretary of the Interior issued the following: "Agents are instructed to obey and cooperate with the military officers in *all* matters looking to the suppression of the outbreak."[14]

Upon Sitting Bull's death, many of his followers voluntarily turned themselves in. However, many bands were still roaming the badlands and were believed armed. One band of particular concern were refugees from Sitting Bull's followers, under the leadership of a chief named Big Foot. In the midst of this already volatile situation, more trouble erupted. On Christmas Day, a band of Sioux (under Kicking Bear's leadership) attacked a unit of Cheyenne U.S. scouts.[15] The question of whether the uprising would evolve into an armed revolt was now beyond discussion. At this point, all of the operational commander's advice, guidance, and orders had been ignored or violated. Miles must have been furious, but the worst was yet to come.

Three days later, Kicking Bear's group surrendered. The last element unaccounted for was Big Foot's band. Big Foot's refugees had eluded capture the week previous and were still considered a threat. Miles issued the following instructions: Big Foot's band were to be apprehended, disarmed, and if not returned immediately to Standing Rock, then to another reservation until the Ghost Dance was under control.[16]

It was with these orders that Major Samuel Whitside and 1st Squadron/7th Cavalry apprehended Big Foot on December 28th. Whitside requested and was granted immediate and unconditional surrender.[17] Whitside directed Big Foot's band to encamp at a nearby bend of Wounded Knee Creek.

Whitside noted that Big Foot was suffering from pneumonia, so he had a Sibley tent (with stove) erected and sent the 7th Cavalry regimental surgeon to look after the ailing chief.[18] Because of diminishing light, Whitside decided to hold off disarmament until morning. He posted two troops to guard the valley and rested the remainder of the squadron and waited for the rest of the regiment.[19]

The Soldiers

In 1890, COL James W. Forsyth commanded 7th Cavalry. He had a distinguished Civil War record, and had even been an *aide de camp* to General Philip Sheridan (this apparently did not put him in favor with Miles).[20] Forsyth was respected in the regiment and exercised a much superior command environment than his most famous predecessor, Custer.[21] Forsyth commanded two squadrons at Wounded Knee. Of these, six troop commanders had been in the regiment with Custer and five of the six had been at Little Big Horn.

Attached to 7th Cavalry were a battery of Hotchkiss guns (a popular Wounded Knee myth is that 7th Cavalry had Gatling (machine) guns and/or heavy artillery. (The Hotchkiss gun was a light, single-shot, one-horse-drawn howitzer that fired a projectile about the size of a Bradley round). Also attached to 7th Cavalry was a troop of Indian scouts, an odd assortment of media (three newspaper reporters), and a non-government agency representative (Father Francis Craft, a missionary at Pine Ridge). Also present were two interpreters, John Shangreau and Phillip Wells. These two men would hear the last words of Big Foot and would later provide the interpretation that ended the fighting.[22]

Big Foot's Band

Big Foot's refugees consisted of a mixture of Hunkpapa and Miniconjou Sioux, totaling 340. Of these, 106 were braves.[23] In terms of force ratios, the Sioux were outnumbered six to one. Based on that reality, it leads one to wonder why they would even consider fighting. It must be remembered that these were tired, cold, hungry, and angry people who had just crossed South Dakota on foot. To complicate matters, they were under the tragic belief that they were wearing bullet-proof shirts. While today we would look in horror at the fact that the Sioux would start a fight in the immediate vicinity of their families, to them it was not a consideration. Fighting for survival on the plains was a business for everyone, whether it was a fight against nature, other Indians, or the white man.

A cruel fact of the Indian Wars was that it was not a conventional war. Quarter was something not expected nor frequently offered. Black Elk, a Sioux Indian who was at both Wounded Knee and Little Big Horn, described a Big Horn scene from his youth that

illustrates the universally understood "No Quarter" concept: "The women swarmed up the hill and began stripping the soldiers… I saw something funny. Two old women were stripping a soldier, who was wounded and playing dead. When they had him naked, they began to cut something that he had, and he jumped up and began fighting with the two fat women. He was swinging one of them around, while the other was trying to stab him with her knife. After a while, another woman rushed up and shoved her knife into him and he died really dead. It was funny to see the naked Wasichu (a Sioux derogatory word for white man) fighting with the fat women."[24]

Despite the harsh realities of Indian warfare and the fact that many of the 7th Cavalry officers and rank and file had been eyewitnesses to the carnage described above 14 years earlier, there is little or no evidence of a revenge motive. In fact, the actions of 7th Cavalry at Wounded Knee paint quite a different picture.

Disarmament and Disaster

Late on the 28th, Forsyth arrived with the remainder of the regiment. His plan for the 29th was as follows: Troops of the second squadron were to remain mounted in troop formation on three sides of the Indian camp. The first squadron was to dismount and be held in reserve close by the fourth side to be used in the event of difficulty during disarmament. The Hotchkiss guns were placed on the hill overlooking the camp. At best, this formation was a show of force or a security cordon.[25]

Spurious versions of Wounded Knee claim that on the night of the 28th, the cavalrymen drank lots of whiskey and were still drunk the next morning. The whiskey story, like the Gatling guns, is another example of revisionist fabrication. No original source, either pro or con 7th Cavalry, mentions whiskey. If there had been drunken revelry, the incident would have been enough to convict Forsyth during the post-Wounded Knee inquiry that acquitted him of all charges.

At reveille on the 29th, rations were distributed to the Indian camp. An hour and a half later, the troops moved into position. Troops A and I remained in the same place occupied the night before. The two troops that would receive the first hostile volley, B and K, formed at the head of the Army camp. Forsyth then sent the interpreters to the Indian camp with instructions for disarmament. Forsyth wanted the Winchester rifles that Whitside had seen the day before.[26] The braves gathered in a rough line in front of Big Foot's tent where Forsyth spoke through the interpreter.[27] The Indian reaction was not what had been expected. The request for weapons was met with extreme reluctance. Two braves were sent to talk with Big Foot, accompanied by interpreter John Shangreau. Even after being given heated accommodations and medical care, Big Foot was distrustful. "Give up the bad guns, and keep the good ones," he told the braves. Shangreau strongly advised the chief to reconsider.[28]

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Forsyth instructed 20 Indians to search the camp for weapons. The braves returned with several old and serviceable firearms and set them near Big Foot. Forsyth had Big Foot brought out of the tent with the hopes that he would encourage others to surrender Winchesters. The ailing chief refused to cooperate.[29]

With no options left, Forsyth fell back on the plan he hoped would not be necessary. B and K troops were moved into the Indian camp and positioned to separate the village (where the women and children were seated) from the braves. B and K troops now stood about 30 meters behind the braves. Whitside and Hoff (the surgeon) recalled that Forsyth again tried to coerce the Indians to give up the Winchesters. He was told there were none left.

Receiving no cooperation, Forsyth ordered a search of the village. The women were thought to be concealing weapons so they were searched. The search turned up weapons of all descriptions, not just Winchesters, but knives, axes, hatchets and bows with arrows.[30]

1LT James Mann (K Troop) described the search: "We went through the tents searching for arms, and while this was going on everyone seemed to be good natured, and we had no thought of trouble. The enlisted men were not allowed to go inside the tents and only took the arms as we officers handed them out. The squaws were sitting on bundles concealing guns and other arms…. The squaws made no resistance, and when we took the arms they seemed to be satisfied. Wallace (the troop commander) played with the children, chucking them under the chin and being as pleasant with them all as could be. He had picked up a stone war club, which he carried with him."[31] It should be noted that CPT Wallace was a veteran of Little Big Horn. This scene does not describe a vengeful prelude to imminent wholesale slaughter.

While the search was in progress, trouble was brewing among the braves. John Shangreau recalls, "A medicine man named Yellow Bird began inciting the Indians in front of Big Foot's tent." "Do not be afraid and let your hearts be strong to meet what is before you. We are all well aware that there are lots of soldiers about us and they have lots of bullets, but I received assurance that their bullets cannot go towards you; they will not penetrate you."[32]

The other interpreter (Wells) anxiously reported Yellow Bird's comments to Whitside and Forsyth. The search had only produced 38 Winchesters.[33] There had to be more somewhere. The only place left to search was under the blankets worn by the braves.

We are left with a vivid description of Yellow Bird from Black Elk's recollections: "Some had not given up their guns and so the soldiers were searching all the teepees, throwing things around and poking into everything. There was a man called Yellow Bird, and he and another man were standing in front of Big Foot's teepee where Big Foot was lying sick. They had white sheets around and over them with eyeholes to look through and *they had guns under these*.[34]

At approximately 0930, Forsyth ordered the search of the braves. He would later have to defend this course of action, but the post-Wounded Knee inquiry vindicated his actions. The key figures in this scene are Yellow Bird, and another Indian named Black Coyote. Black Coyote was described by Wounded Knee survivor, Turning Hawk,

as "a crazy man, a young man of very bad influence and in fact a nobody."[35]

It was this "nobody" and Yellow Bird that bear responsibility for the events leading to violence. Several eyewitness descriptions have been left to us and all are worth examining.

According to a Sioux brave named Spotted Horse, Black Coyote started the firing. He recalls, "This man shot an officer in the Army; the first shot killed this officer… As soon as this shot was fired the Indians immediately began drawing their knives, and they were exhorted from all sides to desist, but this was not obeyed."[36]

Black Elk's version has Yellow Bird as the central figure. "An officer came to search them. He took the other man's gun (Black Coyote?) and then started to take Yellow Bird's. But Yellow Bird would not let go. He wrestled with the officer, and while they were wrestling, the gun went off and killed the officer."[37]

The 1894 inquiry verified the event: "As Yellow Bird spoke in the Sioux language, the officers did not realize the dangerous drift of this talk, and the climax came too quickly for them to interfere. It is said one of the searchers now attempted to raise the blanket of a warrior. Suddenly Yellow Bird stooped down and threw a handful of dust into the air, when as if this were the signal, a young Indian said to have been Black Fox (possibly Black Coyote?) from Cheyenne river, drew a rifle from under his blanket and fired at the soldiers."[38]

PVT Clarence Allen was overlooking the valley and witnessed the event from a different angle: "All of the Indians had big blankets wrapped around them… and each Indian had his rifle under his blanket. When they came to understand they were to be searched, the medicine man (Yellow Bird), …. commenced to dance and blow on a little reed whistle…. The interpreter who was with us said to the commanding officer, "There is going to be trouble" and about that time the medicine man stooped over, picked up a handful of dirt and threw it into the air. That was a signal understood by the bucks (braves), who dropped their blankets, clapped the butts of their rifles under their arms, and pumped lead, not taking any sight. Their rifles by the way were repeating rifles that had come from traders and which they were not expected to have, while we were equipped with single shot carbines."[39]

From a brief account by the artist Frederick Remington, we have additional verification: "Lying on his back, with a bullet through the body (1LT Mann would eventually die from his wounds), Lieutenant Mann grew stern when he got to the critical point in his story. I saw three or four bucks drop their blankets, and I saw that they were armed. Be ready to fire, men, there is going to be trouble… Oh yes, Mann, but the trouble began when the old medicine man threw the dust in the air. That is an old signal of defiance and no sooner than he had done that act than those bucks stripped and went into action…"[40]

Common in all of these versions, regardless of source, is that the Indians fired first. The insanity of this first volley should be measured against the fact that, for the Indians to shoot at the soldiers, they had to fire in the direction of their families, who were seated behind B and K Troops!

Black Elk tells us what happened next: "The warriors rushed to where they had piled their guns and knives. They fought soldiers with only their hands until they got their guns. Dog Chief saw Yellow Bird run into a teepee with his gun, and from there he killed soldiers until the teepee caught fire."[41]

PVT Allen described the 7th Cavalry reaction: "The two troops that formed the inner square (B & K), dropped, ran, did anything they could to get away. One was stabbed and was brained with an Indian club."[42]

During this initial fight, several officers were shot or wounded. CPT Wallace had the top of his head blown off, LT Gresham (B Troop) was shot in the face, LT Garlington took a round in the elbow, interpreter Wells lost most of his nose in a hand-to-hand struggle, and the missionary Father Craft was stabbed in the back.[43] The most noted Indian casualty was Big Foot.

The situation in the valley was now complete confusion. Eyewitnesses describe a wild scene of fleeing Indians, soldiers, women and children, dogs, ponies running in all directions and scattered hand-to-hand struggles occurring near and around the council area. No one person was able to watch it all, but piecing together accounts recreates the event.

It is from this point forward that the Army had to defend its actions. The Indians sources state that after the initial fight, everything that followed was a massacre.[44] They stress that the troops pursued unarmed non-combatants and shot them indiscriminately. The evidence left to us indicates otherwise.

The most controversial subject of Wounded Knee was the use of the Hotchkiss guns. The Indian sources state that as soon as the fighting erupted, the Hotchkiss guns immediately opened fire into the valley.[45] This means that Hotchkiss fire would have engaged soldiers and Indians. CPT Capron stated that he did not fire until the troopers had left the valley and even went so far as to remove friction primers out of the barrels until soldiers were clear.[46]

So, if we are to believe this, where were the Indians when they were hit by Hotchkiss fire? This is one of the most complicated issues of Wounded Knee that clouds any objective study. According to Indian and Army accounts, after the initial fight the Indians either ran for the village or to a ravine that bisected the valley.[47] There was no separation of armed braves and what we would traditionally define as non-combatants. Warriors, women, and children all crowded for cover in the same place. Despite the jeopardy in which the braves placed their families, there was no hesitation on their part to continue the fighting.

What also should be kept in mind is that, true to typical Indian modes of warfare, the braves weren't the only ones firing. Black Elk gives us an example: "Their were two little boys at one place in this gulch (the ravine). They had been killing soldiers all by themselves. We could see the soldiers they had killed. The boys were all alone there, and they were not hurt. They were brave boys."[48]

Similar situations occurred elsewhere. E Troop was in a position overlooking the pony herd. 1LT Sickel watched as a large group of Indians on horseback exited from the valley. He ordered his men *not* to shoot at them. He then modified his orders and said to knock down only the ponies, *not* the riders. Just as he had done so, an old woman on horseback began returning fire at E Troop. 2LT Rice, also of E Troop, had to intervene as a trooper was about to shoot at the woman, "There is a buck, shouted one the troopers and aimed his carbine at her. "No, it is a squaw, don't shoot at her." "Well by God, Lieutenant, she is shooting at us."[49]

Other incidents that document restraint include the actions of I Troop.

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The commander, CPT Nowlan, reported that he allowed a group of women and children to enter the ravine without being shot at. He did not extend the same courtesy to a group of braves that immediately followed the women and children.

Not all Indians ran for the ravine. According to CPT Capron, it is when firing commenced from the teepees (they were firing at the Hotchkiss guns roughly 200 meters away) that he ordered them mown down.[50] It was with this fusillade that Yellow Bird met his fate immediately after shooting a trooper who disobeyed orders and had run up to shoot the medicine man.[51]

As the fight around the perimeter died down, the fighting in the ravine increased. The Hotchkiss guns shifted fire to the ravine. C and D Troops were forced to move for fear of being hit by the exploding shells going off right in front of them.[52] This is the only documented incident of a *potential* of fratricide. From having personally walked the battlefield and observed each troop position, I can certify that *all* the soldiers had to fire down so as to engage the village and the ravine. For the soldiers to risk fratricide would have required a significant lifting and shifting of fire (as the Hotchkiss guns did). Hence this author believes that since the Hotchkiss fire was the only marginally "potential" fratricide event worthy of record, that in all probability there were no others.

According to PVT Allen, fighting in the ravine focused in one area. He recalls: "At the end of the ravine was a deep pocket, probably 25 to 30 feet deep and perhaps 30 to 40 feet in diameter. That, as far as I could see, seemed to be the end of the ravine. The Indians dropped everything they could not take with them easily and beat through the Indian village into the gully and from there they skirmished with troops until we came to this pocket spoken of."[53]

With the majority of Indians in the "pocket," the Hotchkiss guns were now unable to produce effective fire, so one of the gunners, CPL Paul Winert, took it upon himself to move his gun closer. He recalls: "My captain called me back, but I kept shooting. Lieutenant Hawthorne came toward me and was calling, and suddenly I heard him say "Oh, my God!" Looking around, I saw him lying on his side and then I knew he had been hit. Hartzog ran to him and carried him back behind the hill. I said: "By God! I'll make them pay for that" and ran the gun fairly into the opening of the ravine and tried to make every shot count. They kept yelling at me to come back, and I kept yelling for a cool gun, there being three more on the hill *not* in use. Bullets were coming like hail from the Indian Winchesters. The wheels of my gun were bored full of holes and our clothing was marked in several places. Once a cartridge was knocked out of my hand just as I was about to put it in the gun, and it's a wonder the cartridge didn't explode. I kept going farther and pretty soon everything was quiet at the other end of the line. Then the other guns came down."[54]

It was this use of the Hotchkiss gun that in all probability inflicted the most controversial casualities. Corporal Winert's act of insubordination/bravery may seem extreme to some, but it brought the fighting to a close. As the firing diminished, troops were brought down from the hills to clear the ravine. The fighting still centered on the pocket. PVT Allen recalls, "The scrap started in the late forenoon and lasted until about four or five in the afternoon. They surrendered after the interpreter talked with them over the side of the pocket."[55] The interpreter was Phillip Wells. With his nose dangling from his face by a shred of skin, he shouted over the edge of the pocket for the Indians to surrender.

The soldiers brought the wounded of both sides back to the council area and began caring for those in need. Perhaps the best eulogy of the tragic fight came from an Indian named Frog. As he was waiting for treatment Phillip Wells heard him mutter: "He raised himself a little higher and raised his closed fist, pointing it towards the dead Indian, Yellow Bird, shot out his fingers, which is amongst the Indians a deadly insult, meaning I could kill you and not be satisfied doing it, am sorry I could do no more to you… speaking as though to the dead man: "If I could be taken to you I would stab you," then turning to me said, "He is our murderer, only for him inciting our young men we would have all been alive and happy."[56]

The news of Wounded Knee spread like wildfire and all the work that had gone towards bringing peace to Pine Ridge was undone. The very next day, 7th Cavalry was involved in a fight at nearby Drexel Mission and had to be bailed out by the Ninth Cavalry. General Miles, already furious over loss of life at Wounded Knee, relieved Forsyth of command. The post-Wounded Knee inquiry cleared Forsyth and his commanders, but the accusations by Miles against Forsyth are still used by revisionists bent on condemning the Army.

Clearly, Wounded Knee was no My Lai or Malmedy, but the events of Wounded Knee have been so successfully twisted that Wounded Knee is viewed as the ritualistic capstone sacrifice to manifest destiny. As with many other Indian War events, the Army has been unfairly used as the convenient scapegoat.

Concerning Wounded Knee, it should be remembered:

- The Army wanted no part of the Ghost Dance; military action was viewed as unnecessary,
- The Army was brought in only after civilian bureaucracies totally lost control and public safety was imminently threatened,
- The critical mission, and the key to suppressing the Ghost Dance, the arrest of Sitting Bull, was flagrantly undermined and executed clearly against the intent of the operational commander,
- At Wounded Knee, after unconditionally surrendering, being given food/shelter and unusually hospitable medical treatment, it was the Sioux who refused to cooperate un-

der terms they agreed to less than 24 hours before,

- And finally, the Sioux started the fight.

Is it unreasonable for soldiers to return fire when their lives are threatened?

LT Robert G. Carter, (4th Cavalry, circa 1870s) best described the Army's Indian War paradox and made a shockingly accurate prediction of a post-Wounded Knee legacy: "A warfare in which the soldier of the United States had no hope of honors if victorious, no hope of mercy if he fell, slow death by hideous torture if taken alive: sheer abuse from press and pulpit, if, as was inevitable, Indian squaw or child was killed. …Fighting oftentimes against a foe for whom we felt naught but sympathy, yet knew that the response could be but deathless hate…."[57]

Notes

[1] Virgil Vogel, *This Country Was Ours* (New York: Harper Row Publisher, 1972), p. 183. Robert Utley, *The Indian Wars* (American Heritage Publishing Company, 1977), p. 337.

[2]Ibid., Utley, p. 337.

[3]Richard Dillon, *Indian Wars* (Exeter Books, New York, 1984), p. 30.

[4]*New Sources of Indian History* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1934), p. 85.

[5]*Part II, Fourteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, 1892-93* (Washington: Govt. Printing Office, 1896), p. 93.

[6]Dillon, p. 92.

[7]*Part II*, p. 94.

[8]Ibid., p. 98.

[9]*New Sources*, p. 2 and p. 311.

[10]*Part II*, p. 100.

[11]Utley, p. 440.

[12]*Part II*, p. 94.

[13]Ibid., p. 95.

[14]Ibid., p. 95.

[15]Ibid., p. 114.

[16]Robert Utley, *Frontier Regulars* (MacMillan Publishing Co., New York, 1973), p. 146.

[17]Robert Utley, *Last Days of the Sioux Nation* (Vail-Ballou Press Inc., 1963), p. 204.

[18]Dee Brown, *Bury My Heart At Wounded Knee* (Holt, Rinehart, Winston, New York, 1970), p. 441.

[19]Ibid., p. 441.

[20]Utley, *Last Days of the Sioux Nation,* p. 200.

[21]Ibid., p. 200.

[22]Ibid., pp. 203, 204.

[23]*Part II,* p. 114.

[24]John W. Neihardt, *Black Elk Speaks* (Lincoln: University Press of Nebraska Press, 1961), p. 252.

[25]Utley, *Last Days of the Sioux Nation,* p. 204.

[26]Ibid., p. 204.

[27]Ibid., p. 206.

[28]Ibid., p. 206.

[29]Ibid., p. 207.

[30]Ibid., p. 209.

[31]Ibid., p. 209.

[32]Ibid., p. 210.

[33]*Part II,* p. 115.

[34]Neihardt, p. 267.

[35]*Part II,* p. 139.

[36]Ibid., p. 139.

[37]Neihardt, p. 267.

[38]*Part II,* p. 118.

[39]Clarence Allen, PVT, *My Experiences in the Seventh Cavalry*, (Private Collection of Dr. Don G. Rickey, 1954), p. 9.

[40]Frederick Remington, *Frederick Remington's Own West*, (Promontory Press, New York, 1960), p. 252.

[41]Neihardt, p. 267.

[42]Allen, p. 8.

[43]Utley, *Last Days of the Sioux Nation,* p. 214.

[44]*Part II,* p. 119.

[45]Brown, p. 444.

[46]Utley, *Last Days of the Sioux Nation,* p. 215.

[47]Brown, p. 444 and Allen, p. 8.

[48]Neihardt, p. 265.

[49]Utley, *Last Days of the Sioux Nation,* p. 216.

[50]Ibid., p. 217.

[51]Ibid., p. 216.

[52]Ibid., p. 219.

[53]Allen, p. 9.

[54]Utley, *Last Days of the Sioux Nation,* p. 221.

[55]Allen, p. 9.

[56]Utley, *Last Days of the Sioux Nation,* pp. 222-223.

[57]Robert G. Carter, *Memoirs,* (Fort Concho Newsletter, San Angelo, Texas, Jan. 2000), p. 4.

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